Matter of Green v Town of Ramapo

Decision: May 22, 2024
The petitioner: Yosef Green et al.
Respondent: Town of Ramapo Zoning Board of Appeals (and the Town of Ramapo).

In this proceeding brought under Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law & Rules, the petitioners challenged a determination made by the Zoning Board of Appeals (“ZBA”) of the Town of Ramapo on May 7, 2019. That determination granted area-variances to Connectivity Systems, LLC, a developer, in connection with their proposed mixed-use development. The developer had previously obtained a zoning change by the Town and now sought variances to proceed with its project. The petitioners, who live on property adjacent to the development site, sought review of the ZBA’s action. The Supreme Court, Rockland County (Hon. Thomas P. Zugibe, J.), denied the petition on May 13, 2020, and the appellate court affirmed that judgment.

At the core of the appellate decision was the issue of standing. The court reiterated long-standing New York precedent: a petitioner must demonstrate (1) injury in fact, (2) distinct from the public at large, and (3) falling within the “zone of interests” protected by the challenged governmental action. The petitioners contended that as neighbors to the development they had standing. The court held, however, that mere proximity, even living adjacent to the property, does not automatically confer standing.

Further, the petitioners had not established that they were owners or lessees of the property adjacent to the development (which is a prerequisite to challenge a zoning decision in their capacity as affected landowners). They only claimed residency on an adjacent property without showing ownership or leasehold interest. On the question of injury, the court found that the petitioners offered only vague or speculative concerns rather than a specific harm different in kind or degree from that of the general public. The variances approved by the ZBA did not directly affect their property, and accordingly, the harm claimed was insufficient to support standing.

Because the foundational standing requirements were not met, the appellate court did not address the other arguments raised by the petitioners. The judgment of the Supreme Court was affirmed, with costs. In essence, this case reinforces that in New York land-use litigation mere adjacency to a development does not guarantee standing to challenge zoning board decisions; petitioners must demonstrate a concrete and particularized injury and, if relying on landowner or lessee status, must show a qualifying interest in the property.

Source: https://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2024/2024_02816.htm

Matter of Cuomo v. East Williston Union Free School District

Decision: May 15, 2024
The petitioners: Paula Cuomo et al. (including Matthew Cuomo).
Respondents: East Williston Union Free School District and its Board of Education.

In April 2019, the East Williston Union Free School District (the “District”) obtained a building permit from the New York State Education Department (“SED”) for the construction of a six-foot-high fence around three sides of North Side School in the Village of East Williston. On May 7, 2019, SED advised the District that its building permit approval was separate and distinct from any required local zoning approvals by the Village of East Williston. Nonetheless, the District commenced construction on or about August 8, 2019, without seeking local zoning approval.

In August 2019, the petitioners, residents of the village, filed a hybrid proceeding under CPLR Article 78 and a declaratory judgment action. They challenged the district’s determination to begin constructing the fence without obtaining requisite zoning approvals. They sought declarations that (1) the district is not absolutely immune from local zoning laws, (2) local zoning laws apply when no state statute or regulation conflicts, and (3) with respect to the fence and its height, the district is subject to the Village’s jurisdiction because no state law preempted its zoning laws.

The district moved under CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the petition/complaint on multiple grounds: lack of standing, failure to join SED and the Commissioner of Education as necessary parties, statute of limitations, and failure to file a notice of claim under Education Law § 3813. The Supreme Court, Nassau County, granted the petition in an order and judgment dated October 9, 2019, without the district having answered, and issued the requested declarations. A subsequent order entered October 16, 2019, denied the district’s motion to dismiss.

On appeal, the Appellate Division considered two threshold issues: standing and necessary‐party joinder. As to standing, the court reiterated that a petitioner must show a real harm distinct from the general public and that the interest asserted falls within the zone of interests protected by the statute. The petitioners who lived adjacent to the school could ordinarily show standing if the zoning violation depressed the value or character of the immediate neighborhood. However, the petition failed to allege that the petitioners Rita Botensten, Edward Murphy, Richard Kearns, Maureen Kearns, Kathleen Daw, Phil Strauss, Carla Strauss, and John Wanamaker lived in close proximity to the school. Accordingly, they failed to show injury distinct from the community at large and the court held that branch of the motion to dismiss must be granted.

With respect to joinder of necessary parties, the court held that SED and the Commissioner of Education are necessary parties because the resolution of the declaratory claims would affect their rights regarding school safety standards and approval of school construction plans. Since they were not joined, dismissal was not automatic, but the Supreme Court must determine first whether joinder is possible, and if not whether the proceeding may continue under CPLR 1001(b).

Accordingly, the Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s order and judgment insofar as appealed, modified it by granting dismissal of the petition as to the first group of petitioners, and remitted the matter to the Supreme Court for further proceedings consistent with the requirement of joinder. Costs were awarded to the respondents.

In summary, while the petitioners raised serious questions about a school district’s obligation to comply with local zoning laws despite state permitting, the appellate court declined to reach the substantive merits because the procedural prerequisites standing of all petitioners and proper joinder of state educational authorities, were not satisfied.

Source:https://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2024/2024_02702.htm

Matter of Roger Manning v. City Council of the City of New York et al.

Decision: December 9, 2022
Plaintiff/Appellant: Roger Manning.
Defendants/Respondents: City Council of the City of New York and The Trust for Governors Island.

In this Article 78 proceeding, petitioner Roger Manning sought to annul a May 27, 2021 amendment to the New York City Zoning Resolution and zoning map that affected Governors Island. The amendment, approved by the New York City Council at the request of The Governors Island Corporation, doing business as The Trust for Governors Island, permitted redevelopment of certain areas of the island to include mixed-use, institutional, and commercial facilities. Manning argued that the zoning action violated restrictive covenants in prior federal deeds governing the island’s use and that it infringed the public trust doctrine protecting parkland. The Supreme Court, New York County (Justice Lynn R. Kotler) denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding, and the Appellate Division unanimously affirmed.

The court first addressed Manning’s principal claim that the zoning amendments were arbitrary and unpredictable because they conflicted with restrictive covenants embedded in the deeds transferring the island’s property from the U.S. National Park Service to the Trust’s predecessors. These covenants were meant to preserve parts of the island for public, educational, or open-space purposes. However, the court held that Manning lacked standing to enforce such private covenants, citing Mendel v. Henry Phipps Plaza West, Inc. (6 N.Y.3d 783 [2006]). Only parties with a direct property interest or those named in the covenant can assert such claims. Manning’s attempt to challenge the zoning amendments through the covenants therefore failed procedurally.

Substantively, the court explained that zoning laws and private covenants operate independently. Zoning ordinances are legislative enactments, while restrictive covenants are private agreements; a zoning resolution cannot “abrogate” a private covenant, but nor can a private covenant nullify a legislative zoning amendment. Citing Matter of Friends of Shawangunks v. Knowlton (64 N.Y.2d 387 [1985]) and Gordon v. Incorporated Village of Lawrence (84 A.D.2d 558 [1981], aff’d 56 N.Y.2d 1003 [1982]), the court held that the City Council acted within its legislative discretion.

Manning’s alternative argument, invoking the public trust doctrine, also failed. While part of the island contains a 43-acre public park, the record offered no evidence of planned alienation or non-park development by the Trust. Without an actual plan to transfer or repurpose parkland, the claim was deemed not ripe for judicial review. The court distinguished prior parkland-alienation cases such as Avella v. City of New York (29 N.Y.3d 425 [2017]) and Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. City of New York (95 N.Y.2d 623 [2001]), emphasizing that theoretical or speculative harm does not satisfy the ripeness requirement.

In conclusion, the court affirmed the City Council’s zoning amendment, holding that Manning lacked standing, that private restrictive covenants cannot override legislative zoning powers, and that no ripe controversy existed regarding the public trust doctrine. The ruling reinforces the separation between private land covenants and public zoning authority, as well as the limited judicial reach over unripe or speculative land-use disputes involving public lands.

Source:https://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2024/2024_01116.htm

Matter of Town of Ramapo (Weis)

Decision: May 14, 2025
Plaintiff (Appellant): Town of Ramapo.
Defendant (Respondent): David Weis.

In this eminent-domain proceeding, the Town of Ramapo challenged a ruling of the Supreme Court, Rockland County, which denied the Town’s motion for summary judgment and allowed David Weis’s compensation claim to proceed. The dispute centers on a roadway and sidewalk widening project along Route 306 initiated by the Town in February 2020. The project sought to acquire various parcels, including one labelled “Map 10” adjacent to the highway; Weis, owner of a neighboring property, claimed that the taking rendered him entitled to compensation for consequential damages.

Weis alleged that although the Town did not directly appropriate his parcel, the acquisition of adjacent land disrupted his access to the highway and eliminated a buffer or setback zone, rendering his remainder property less valuable. The Town moved in May 2021 to dismiss the claim related to Map 10, arguing Weis lacked standing and had failed to demonstrate an actionable property right or compensable injury. The Supreme Court denied the motion in November 2021, prompting this appeal.

On appeal, the Second Department reversed. First, it held that the Town met its prima facie burden by showing Weis was not the record owner of the Map 10 parcel and that he retained an appropriate right of access to public roads adjacent to his property. Accordingly, the Town’s motion for summary judgment should have been granted. Second, the court addressed Weis’s adverse possession claim concerning Map 10. His assertion was deemed “vague, conclusory and insufficient” to raise a triable issue of fact. Third, the court rejected his argument that the loss of a highway buffer or setback arising from a neighbor’s taking established a compensable injury. Under New York law, convenience or diminished buffer zones alone do not amount to a compensable taking when access remains viable.

Because the Town had demonstrated entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, and Weis failed to raise a genuine factual dispute, the court found the lower court erred in denying summary judgment. The remaining arguments were therefore not reached. The Appellate Division thus reversed the Supreme Court’s order, granted the Town’s motion, and dismissed Weis’s claim for compensation arising from the Map 10 parcel.

In summary, this decision reinforces that in eminent-domain contexts, a property owner must show a legally cognizable property interest affected by the taking, and mere loss of a buffer or setback without impairment of access does not, by itself, warrant compensation. The procedural rigor of the summary-judgment standard in condemnation litigation is also highlighted: the condemner may prevail if it conclusively shows no actionable claim and the claimant fails to raise meaningful factual issues.

Source:https://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2025/2025_02923.htm

Matter of Jerome Norton v. Town of Brookhaven et al.

Decision: May 16, 2023 (by the Second Circuit), originating from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York (No. 2:13-cv-03520)
Plaintiff/Appellant: Jerome Norton.
Defendants/Respondents: Town of Brookhaven; County of Suffolk; and Town officials Robert Quinlan, David J. Moran, Jennifer Lutzer, Justin Folber, William Powell, and Valerie Biscardi

In this protracted civil rights and state-law action, plaintiff Jerome Norton challenged the Town of Brookhaven’s enforcement of local building and safety codes against his rental property and pressed declaratory relief regarding the validity of certain Town ordinances. Specifically, Norton alleged that, in 2011, the Town charged him with multiple violations of the Town Code and the New York State Uniform Fire Prevention and Building Code (“Uniform Code”) in connection with his 50 % ownership of a residential property in Coram, New York. After the state-court charges were dismissed under CPL 170.40, Norton initiated suit in June 2013 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and New York law, asserting First Amendment retaliation, malicious prosecution, substantive and procedural due process, and other claims.

The Town and County moved to dismiss. In July 2014, the district court granted the County’s motion in full and granted in part the Town’s. Pursuant to a Partial Stipulation and Order signed October 18, 2017, all federal claims against the Town were dismissed, leaving three state law claims: (1) that the Town’s Chapter 82 fire-and-safety ordinance exceeded the Uniform Code and thus required state approval; (2) that Chapter 82 functioned as a zoning ordinance and thus required Suffolk County referral under NY GML § 239-m; and (3) violation of NY Town Law § 262.

In March 2022 the district court granted the Town’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, dismissing the remaining claims. On appeal, the Second Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion by exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims after all federal claims had been dismissed, emphasizing that complex or unsettled state-law issues ordinarily should be left to state courts. Accordingly, the appellate court vacated the judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss the remaining claims without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

This decision highlights several critical jurisprudential concepts: first, the limitations of federal jurisdiction when only state-law claims remain; second, the doctrine that municipalities’ building and fire safety bylaws may implicate state codes or referral statutes if they supersede state minimums; and third, the procedural import of the law-of-the-case and timeliness doctrines in pleading challenges. Norton’s attempt to obtain federal adjudication of his declaratory-judgment state-law claims stalled not on the merits of these claims, but on the proper jurisdictional venue. By remanding for dismissal without prejudice, the Second Circuit permitted Norton to pursue his claims in state court, while reminding litigants and courts alike that federal forums should refrain from deciding novel or unsettled state-law questions when their original basis (federal claims) has been extinguished.

Source: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8880802356653052704&q=Norton+v.+Town+of+Brookhaven&hl=en&as_sdt=6,33

Matter of Demarest v. Town of Underhill

Decision: February 26, 2021
Plaintiff/Appellant: David Demarest
Defendant/Respondent: Town of Underhill

Claim preclusion (res judicata). In previous litigation challenging the highway’s reclassification, Demarest could have raised but did not raise his access claim. As the Court explained, “the prior reclassification case involved substantially the same cause of action … and the right of access could have been fully litigated.”

Source: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11578756446676419812&q=Demarest+v.+Town+of+Underhill&hl=en&as_sdt=2006

Matter of Serafim Georgios Katergaris v. City of New York

Decision: June 24, 2024 (Judgment entered June 25, 2024)
Plaintiff: Serafim Georgios Katergaris
Defendant: City of New York

In this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Katergaris alleged that the City’s system, via the New York City Department of Buildings (DOB), for imposing fines on property-owners who fail to file required annual low-pressure boiler inspection reports violated due process guarantees by depriving them of a meaningful hearing. He challenged the issuance and enforcement of a boiler-inspection violation under 1 R.C.N.Y. § 103-01 and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 27-793(b) for a property he owned, arguing that his due-process rights were breached because the City purportedly failed to provide adequate notice, a neutral decision-maker, or an appeal opportunity.

Factual Background: Katergaris purchased property at 124 W 132nd Street, New York City, in November 2014. Prior to his ownership, the property reportedly had a low-pressure boiler that required annual inspection reporting. A prior owner failed to file a required inspection report for the 2013 cycle, and the DOB issued a Notice of Violation in March 2015 (after Katergaris’s purchase) for that failure. The City contended that the notice was mailed to Katergaris. However, he claimed he never received it and only became aware of the outstanding violation when attempting to sell the property in 2021.

Procedural History: Katergaris filed his complaint on August 30, 2022. The City moved to dismiss. In July 2023 the court converted part of the motion (timeliness) into a summary-judgment motion, following limited discovery on the issue of when the statute of limitations began.

Court’s Decision: On June 24, 2024, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York granted the City’s motion for summary judgment, holding that Katergaris’s claim was time-barred. The court found that the three-year statute of limitations on § 1983 claims (derived from New York’s personal-injury limit) began to run in March 2015, when the violation notice was mailed, and thus expired long before the August 2022 filing. The City had provided sufficient evidence of mailing under the “mailbox rule” presumption, and Katergaris failed to rebut this presumption with admissible proof of non-receipt. Because the untimeliness ground was dispositive, the court did not address other arguments raised by the City (such as failure to state a claim). Judgment was entered on June 25, 2024.

Significance: The case illustrates the importance of timely filing in constitutional claims against municipalities and reaffirms the applicability of the mailbox-rule presumption of receipt in New York’s federal courts. It further emphasizes that property owners who challenge municipal enforcement schemes must remain vigilant about notices and deadlines even when they contend, they did not receive formal communications.

Source:https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11516387055700784580&q=Katergaris+v.+City+of+New+York&hl=en&as_sdt=6,33

Matter of Chestnut Hill NY, Inc. and Joseph Sangiovanni v. City of Kingston, Office of Planning, and Building Safety and Zoning Enforcement

Decision: October 13, 2023
Plaintiffs: Chestnut Hill NY, Inc., Joseph Sangiovanni
Defendants: City of Kingston, City of Kingston Office of Planning, City of Kingston Building Safety and Zoning

In this federal civil rights action, plaintiffs Chestnut Hill NY, Inc., a boarding home for individuals with mental illness, and its president Joseph Sangiovanni sued the City of Kingston, its Office of Planning, and Building Safety and Zoning Enforcement after the City’s 2023 denial of Chestnut Hill’s renewal for a Special Use Permit. The plaintiffs alleged violations of the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), arguing that the City’s actions constituted disability discrimination and a failure to provide reasonable accommodations. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory damages, and specifically a temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction (PI) to prevent eviction and ensure continued operation of the home.

The case followed a prior federal action in 2017, in which Chestnut Hill had obtained a TRO preventing eviction and ultimately reached a settlement allowing the home to operate under a variance and an annually renewable permit. The 2023 denial renewed long-standing tensions between the facility and the City over safety compliance, occupancy, and maintenance conditions.

The Northern District of New York, before considering the injunction, addressed Article III standing. The court found that the corporate entity and its residents had standing due to the direct threat of eviction, but that Sangiovanni himself lacked independent standing because his alleged injuries were derivative of the corporation’s harms. Turning to the injunction standards, the court acknowledged that eviction and displacement of disabled residents constituted irreparable harm, satisfying the first prong of the test. However, the plaintiffs failed to meet the second prong, the likelihood of success on the merits.

On the merits, the court analyzed three theories under the FHA and ADA: intentional discrimination, disparate impact, and failure to accommodate. It applied the burden-shifting framework for intentional discrimination and found no evidence of discriminatory animus among current City officials. Public hearing records revealed that most community complaints involved building-code violations, fire-safety deficiencies, and structural concerns, not residents’ disabilities. The City’s justification for denying renewal, ongoing violations, fire-escape deficiencies, and safety risks, was deemed legitimate and nondiscriminatory. The plaintiffs’ remaining claims failed for lack of specificity. They had not identified a requested accommodation or a neutral policy that disproportionately burdened disabled persons.

Because the plaintiffs could not demonstrate a likelihood of success on any substantive claim, the court denied their motion for both a TRO and preliminary injunction, without reaching the remaining equitable factors such as balance of hardships or public interest.

In summary, the court concluded that while Chestnut Hill’s residents faced serious consequences from eviction, the evidence did not support a finding of disability discrimination. The ruling highlights the rigorous evidentiary burden in FHA and ADA injunction cases, where allegations of bias must be substantiated beyond procedural hardship, and affirms municipal authority to enforce legitimate health and safety regulations when applied neutrally.

Source:https://lawoftheland.wordpress.com/2025/08/28/fed-dist-court-in-ny-denies-boarding-homes-request-for-temporary-restraining-order-preliminary-injunction-and-renewal-of-special-use-permit/

Matter of Masic v. Town of Franklinville, New York

Decision: August 27, 2025
Plaintiffs: Individual homeowners (the Masics)
Defendants: Town of Franklinville and officials, Town Supervisor, Code Enforcement Officer, Dog Control Officer

In this federal civil rights and land-use action, the plaintiffs, private homeowners in Franklinville, alleged that Town officials harassed, trespassed upon their property, and selectively enforced zoning and building codes against them out of personal animus. Their twelve-count complaint asserted both federal and state constitutional violations, including claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for equal protection, substantive and procedural due process, Monell liability, and related torts. The alleged misconduct occurred between 2017 and 2023 and centered on disputes over the construction of the plaintiffs’ home and barn, their small-scale dog-breeding operation, and agricultural activities on their property.

The plaintiffs claimed that their neighbors, who were close friends of the Town’s Dog Control and Code Enforcement Officers, vowed to drive them out of town and conspired with officials to do so. They alleged repeated trespasses, fabricated code violations, excessive inspections (nineteen compared to the average of six for other homes) and retaliatory citations. According to the complaint, the Town prosecuted them for operating a dog kennel without a permit even though they had only three licensed dogs and no special permit was required. Officials allegedly warned another breeder to obtain a permit retroactively “to cover up” selective enforcement and engaged in a campaign of reputational harm, including critical newspaper articles authored by the Town Supervisor.

The District Court denied the Town’s motion to dismiss several key claims. On the Equal Protection Clause claim, the court held that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged selective enforcement and “class-of-one” discrimination, supported by detailed factual allegations showing malice, personal animus, and disparate treatment relative to similarly situated property owners. The court found Monell liability plausible because the Town Supervisor and Board members, as final policymakers, allegedly knew of, directed, or acquiesced in the misconduct. The court further ruled that the claims were timely and that plaintiffs were not required to exhaust administrative remedies before filing an equal protection suit.

The court also sustained the plaintiffs’ substantive due process claim, reasoning that they plausibly alleged deprivation of a vested property interest in their land’s agricultural and residential use. The alleged stop-work orders, false citations, and unlawful prosecutions could constitute arbitrary governmental action violating substantive due process. The court found, however, that plaintiffs failed to state viable claims for First Amendment retaliation, procedural due process, trespass, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligence.

In summary, the Western District of New York allowed the plaintiffs’ federal and state equal protection claims and federal substantive due process claim to proceed, rejecting the Town’s broad motion to dismiss. The decision underlines that personal animus, selective enforcement, and abuse of zoning power, when plausibly alleged with factual detail, can expose municipalities to liability under § 1983 and Monell, particularly where policymaking officials are personally implicated.

Source:https://lawoftheland.wordpress.com/2025/09/25/fed-dist-court-in-ny-upholds-claims-of-arbitrary-enforcement-of-town-code-and-zoning-laws-based-on-personal-animus/

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